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Difficulties remembering one’s own experiences via episodic memory may affect the ability
to imagine other people’s experiences during theory of mind (ToM). Previous work shows
that the same set of brain regions recruited during tests of episodic memory and future
imagining are also engaged during standard laboratory tests ofToM. However, hippocampal
amnesic patients who show deficits in past and future thinking, show intact performance
onToM tests, which involve unknown people or fictional characters. Here we present data
from a developmental amnesic person (H.C.) and a group of demographically matched con-
trols, who were tested on a naturalistic test ofToM that involved describing other people’s
experiences in response to photos of personally familiar others (“pToM” condition) and
unfamiliar others (“ToM” condition). We also included a condition that involved recollect-
ing past experiences in response to personal photos (“EM” condition). Narratives were
scored using an adapted Autobiographical Interview scoring procedure. Due to the visually
rich stimuli, internal details were further classified as either descriptive (i.e., details that
describe the visual content of the photo) or elaborative (i.e., details that go beyond what
is visually depicted in the photo). Relative to controls, H.C. generated significantly fewer
elaborative details in response to the pToM and EM photos and an equivalent number of
elaborative details in response to theToM photos.These data converge with previous neu-
roimaging results showing that the brain regions underlying pToM and episodic memory
overlap to a greater extent than those supporting ToM. Taken together, these results sug-
gest that detailed episodic representations supported by the hippocampus may be pivotal
for imagining the experiences of personally familiar, but not unfamiliar, others.
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INTRODUCTION
Amnesia following damage to the hippocampus has been char-
acterized by impaired episodic memory for personally experi-
enced events. However, there is growing evidence that other, non-
mnemonic processes may be compromised in amnesia as well.
These findings have led researchers to suggest a broader role for
the hippocampus and episodic memory that goes beyond recall-
ing past personal experiences. Much of this work has focused on
the idea that episodic memory is necessary for imagining possible
future scenarios (Tulving, 1985; Klein et al., 2002; Okuda et al.,
2003; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al.,
2007; Andelman et al., 2010), whereas much less attention has been
paid to the role that episodic memory plays in social behavior. In
the current study, we examined if, and under what conditions, the
ability to remember and imagine one’s own experiences serves a
social function in facilitating the ability to imagine other people’s
experiences.
An impressive body of research has shown that episodic mem-
ory, supported by the hippocampus, is closely related to the ability
to imagine one’s own personal future. Amnesic individuals with
hippocampal damage who are unable to recollect past events also
have difficulty imagining themselves in future events (Tulving,
1985; Klein et al., 2002; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Andelman et al.,
2010). Consistent with this finding, neuroimaging studies have
revealed that both abilities recruit a similar set of brain regions
that include the hippocampus and adjacent medial temporal lobe
(MTL) regions as well as medial frontal, medial parietal, and lateral
temporal cortex (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar
et al., 2007). Some of these studies have included a control condi-
tion in which participants are asked to imagine the experiences
of an “average” person or a famous person, which appears to
engage regions within the MTL as well, albeit to a lesser extent
(Szpunar et al., 2007; see also Gilboa et al., 2004). However, it may
be the case that episodic memory and associated MTL function
play an important role in imagining other people’s experiences,
as suggested by qualitative reviews and meta-analyses of the neu-
roimaging literature. These studies show that the same set of brain
regions activated during tests of episodic memory and future
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imagining are also engaged during standard tests of theory of
mind (ToM; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis and Maguire,
2007; Spreng et al., 2009).
In addition to an overlapping set of brain regions, episodic
memory, future imagining, and ToM emerge close in time in
ontogenetic development (Perner and Ruffman, 1995; Atance
and O’Neil, 2001; Perner et al., 2007) and tend to be impaired
in patients with schizophrenia (Corcoran and Frith, 2003;
D’Argembeau et al., 2008) and high functioning autism and
Asperger’s syndrome (Adler et al., 2010; Lind and Bowler, 2010).
These findings lend support to an influential theoretical perspec-
tive that individuals draw on past experiences via episodic memory
to simulate future personal experiences and to imagine other peo-
ple’s experiences during ToM (Gordon, 1986; Goldman, 1992; Cor-
coran, 2000, 2001; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Buckner and Carroll,
2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007; Spreng and Mar, 2012). How-
ever, work with hippocampal amnesic patients shows preserved
performance on standard tests of ToM despite impaired episodic
memory and future imagining (Rosenbaum et al., 2007; Rabin
et al., 2012). Standard ToM tests included in these studies ranged
from predicting a character’s false belief (Stone et al., 1998) and
identifying a faux pas (Stone et al., 1998) based on narratives, to
inferring others’ thoughts and emotions based on viewing the eye
region of faces (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The amnesic patients’
successful performance on these tests may have been achieved
via semantic memory, which remains relatively intact in these
patients (Rosenbaum et al., 2007). This might include reliance on
social knowledge of the average person’s thoughts, feelings, and
intentions in different circumstances (Lieberman, 2012).
More recent neuroimaging studies have directly compared
episodic memory with ToM in the same individuals using more
naturalistic stimuli (Rabin et al., 2010; Spreng and Grady, 2010; St.
Jacques et al., 2011; see also Gilboa et al., 2004; Szpunar et al., 2007).
These studies revealed that relative to recalling past episodes, imag-
ining the experiences of other people elicited less activity within
MTL and midline regions. However, the “other” targets in these
studies were not intimately known by participants (i.e., strangers
or public figures). It is possible that when the target person is
personally known, shared past experiences can influence partic-
ipants’ current social processing. Indeed, knowing someone for
a long period of time and observing that person’s behavior in
different situations provides a rich source of information from
which one can draw when imagining his/her mental states in spe-
cific situations. Consistent with this idea, Rabin and Rosenbaum
(2012) recently showed that imagining the experiences of per-
sonally familiar versus unfamiliar others preferentially engaged
regions known to support episodic memory, suggesting a strategy
of relying on past personal experiences when the target person is
personally known. In another study, Krienen et al. (2010) focused
exclusively on midline frontal regions and found greater anterior
medial prefrontal cortex and rostral anterior cingulate cortex activ-
ity for judgments relating to participants’ friends versus strangers.
In fact,participants in that study indicated that they relied on a spe-
cific memory or anecdote significantly more often for judgments
relating to friends than strangers. Perry et al. (2011) showed that
hippocampal activity during judgments of others’ emotional states
was specific to conditions in which the protagonist was deemed
similar to the self and when the event had occurred in the partici-
pant’s own life. Taken together, these studies suggest that episodic
memory may serve a social role in imagining other people’s expe-
riences, but only when intimacy or closeness exists between the
participant and the perceived other.
In the current study, we test the idea that episodic memory is
necessary for imagining events from the perspective of personally
known others. One way to address this question is to assess whether
a person with hippocampal amnesia and impaired episodic mem-
ory is able to imagine events experienced by well-known others,
including reconstructing others’ thoughts and feelings. Here, we
test H.C., a unique young woman with normal intellectual func-
tion despite impaired development of her episodic memory due to
selective hippocampal damage 1 week after birth (Vargha-Khadem
et al., 2003; Rosenbaum et al., 2011; see also Kwan et al., 2010; Hur-
ley et al., 2011). Importantly, as was the case for the adult-onset
hippocampal amnesic cases described above, we recently found
that H.C.’s performance on a wide range of standard ToM tests
was indistinguishable from that of controls (Rabin et al., 2012).
We believe that her preserved ToM performance is due to reliance
on her semantic memory and general knowledge abilities, which
remain relatively intact (Rabin et al., 2012). In the current study we
employed a naturalistic test of ToM that involved describing the
experiences of other people in response to photos of personally
known others (i.e., relatives and close friends; “pToM” condi-
tion) and unknown others (“ToM” condition) engaging in specific
events. We also included a condition that involved recollecting past
experiences in response to personal photos (“EM”condition). This
naturalistic task was selected because it is less constrained than
most standard tests of ToM and therefore better captures ToM as
it occurs in everyday life. Findings of impaired pToM that paral-
lel H.C.’s episodic memory deficit would suggest that pToM relies
on episodic memory or that a common process mediates both
abilities. Alternatively, it may be the case that intact aspects of
H.C.’s semantic memory are sufficient to support mental state
inferences involving pToM and ToM, and therefore H.C. would
show intact performance on both tasks, similar to her performance
on standard ToM tests.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
H.C. is a right-handed woman who was 20 years old at the time
of testing. A second testing session was performed when H.C.
was 23 years old for reliability purposes. She was born prema-
turely and suffered hypoxic damage, which led to reduced bilateral
hippocampal volume by approximately 50% relative to healthy
controls (Vargha-Khadem et al., 2003; Hurley et al., 2011; see
Rosenbaum et al., 2011 for a detailed neuropsychological profile).
H.C.’s compromised bilateral hippocampal development appears
to have precluded normal development of her episodic memory.
Her impairment affects her personal and public event memory
more than her personal and general semantic memory (Rosen-
baum et al., 2011), which is consistent with other developmental
amnesic cases (Gadian et al., 2000). H.C. successfully graduated
from a mainstream high school and completed 1 year of technical
college. At the time of the first testing session, she was enrolled
in a post-secondary culinary program but withdrew after 1 year.
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H.C. has formed a normal number of close relationships (David-
son et al., 2012, this issue) and was engaged to be married at the
second time of testing.
H.C.’s performance on all measures was compared with that
of 18 right-handed, healthy women with no reported history of
neurological or psychiatric illness (mean age= 19.4, SD= 1.3;
mean education= 13.3, SD= 1.1). All participants gave informed
written consent in accordance with the ethics review boards
at York University and Baycrest. Participants received monetary
compensation for their time.
STIMULI
We employed a novel, naturalistic test of ToM that involved
describing others’ thoughts and feelings in response to photos
of personally familiar others (“pToM” condition) and unfamil-
iar others (“ToM” condition) engaging in specific events. We
also included a condition that involved recollecting past experi-
ences in response to personal photos (“EM” condition; Rabin and
Rosenbaum, 2012).
The pToM condition involving personally known others con-
sisted of 15 photos depicting specific events that had been expe-
rienced by family members and close friends but not by the
participant him/herself. The ToM condition involving unfamil-
iar others consisted of 15 photos depicting strangers engaged in
specific events. The EM condition consisted of 15 personal family
photos of events that took place within the past 1–5 years. H.C.
and 13 of the 18 control participants appeared in each EM photo
to help verify that the participant personally experienced the event.
Analyses confirmed that the presence or absence of the control par-
ticipants in the EM photos did not affect the behavioral results (i.e.,
average number of internal details did not differ, t (16)=−0.47,
p= 0.64). The pToM and EM photos were collected by a rela-
tive or close friend of each participant, whereas the ToM photos
were collected by the experimenter. Themes were similar across
the three conditions (e.g., birthday party, picnic, vacation) and
included both indoor and outdoor scenes. All photos were resized
and converted to gray scale.
TASK
H.C. and the control participants were scanned with fMRI while
performing the family photos task (fMRI data not reported here).
Stimuli were presented in blocks and each block contained five
photos from one of the three conditions. There were three blocks
for each condition (for a total of nine blocks) and these were pre-
sented in pseudorandom order. At the beginning of each block,
participants viewed a set of instructions that corresponded to one
of the three conditions (i.e., pToM, ToM, or EM). Each photo
was presented for 20 s and was followed by three rating scales (see
below).
In the pToM and ToM conditions, participants were presented
with photos of other people and asked to generate a novel event for
each photo while focusing on what one person in the photo might
have been thinking and feeling at the time. In order to distin-
guish imagining from remembering, participants were specifically
instructed not to draw on past experiences when generating these
events. In the EM condition, participants were presented with their
own photos and asked to recollect the event depicted in each photo
in as much detail as possible. They were told to focus on what they
were thinking and feeling at the time.
Following the presentation of each photo, participants rated
the events they imagined/recollected on a number of dimen-
sions. Three ratings scales were presented after each photo. The
first rating scale differed for the pToM/ToM and EM events. The
pToM and ToM events were rated for likeness to an actual mem-
ory (1= exactly like a memory . . . 4= nothing like a memory),
whereas the EM events were rated on the extent to which the
events were recollected (1= don’t know event; 2= familiar with
event; 3= remember event; Gardiner et al., 1998; Tulving, 1985).
Participants were instructed to select “remember” if the event was
specific to a time and place and they could re-experience it, to
select “familiar with event” if the event was familiar to them, but
they could not recall any specific contextual or other experiential
details associated with the event, and to select “don’t know event”
if they were unable to recall any aspect of the event. The next two
ratings scales were employed for all conditions. One scale assessed
the amount of detail generated for each event (1= not vivid . . .
4= very vivid) and the other scale assessed the spatial coherence of
each event (contiguousness of the spatial context: 1= fragmented
scenes . . . 4= continuous scene; Hassabis et al., 2007; not reported
in the current study).
Prior to the scan, a short training session was provided to
ensure that participants fully understood the task instructions.
The photos used in the training session were not used during
the scan.
Immediately following the scan, participants took part in an
interview in which they viewed the same photos that had been
presented in the scanner. Participants were asked to think back to
the events they generated in the scanner and to rate each event on
the same three scales that were presented in the scanner. The pho-
tos with the highest vividness ratings (approximately two-thirds
of all photos) were selected for a semi-structured interview in
which participants described the events as they had been imag-
ined/recollected in the scanner.1 High vividness ratings were taken
to suggest that participants were indeed imagining or recollecting
the events. There was no time limit for participants to describe the
events, and participants continued with their descriptions until
they came to a natural ending point. The examiner then pro-
vided a single, standardized probe to elicit additional details (e.g.,
“Can you tell me anything else?”). The events were recorded and
transcribed for scoring.
Control participants were tested on the family photos paradigm
once whereas H.C. was tested on the paradigm on two separate
occasions for reliability purposes. However, the EM events that
were included during H.C.’s first testing session were excluded
because we subsequently learned that she frequently views and
rehearses the events depicted in these photos.
SCORING
Narratives were scored using an adapted Autobiographical Inter-
view scoring procedure described by Levine et al. (2002). The
1During session 2, H.C. was interviewed on all of the photos presented during the
scan as well as eight additional EM events, which were not presented in the scanner,
in order to increase power.
www.frontiersin.org January 2013 | Volume 3 | Article 588 | 3
Rabin et al. Episodic memory and imagining others’ experiences
pToM, ToM, and EM events were first segmented into distinct
details, which were classified as internal (including event-specific,
temporal, perceptual, spatial, and thought/emotion details) or
external (i.e., semantic facts that were irrelevant to the central
event, repetitions, and metacognitive statements). Given the use
of visually rich photos as cues, we wanted to ensure that partici-
pants’ performance was not inflated due to merely describing the
details depicted in the photos. Therefore, internal details were fur-
ther classified as either descriptive (i.e., details that describe the
visual content of the photo) or elaborative (i.e., details that go
beyond what is visually depicted in the photo; see Table 1 for
scoring criteria).
Scoring of the narratives was conducted by a trained rater
who achieved high interrater reliability on the Autobiographi-
cal Interview using a standard set of previously scored memories
(see Levine et al., 2002). Interrater reliability was also calcu-
lated for the elaborative and descriptive details based on criteria
developed by JSR. Intraclass correlation analyses indicated high
agreement among scorers for pToM (Cronbach’s α= 0.994), ToM
(Cronbach’s α= 0.992), and EM events (Cronbach’s α= 0.994).
Data were analyzed using a modified t -test procedure, which
compares test scores of a single patient to that of a small control
sample (Crawford and Howell, 1998). Two-tailed t -tests were used
to compare H.C.’s performance with that of controls on the pToM
and ToM conditions, whereas a one-tailed t -test was used for the
EM condition given a priori hypotheses regarding H.C.’s episodic
memory performance.
RESULTS
As mentioned above, H.C. was tested on two separate occasions.
For completeness, we report the data separately for the two testing
sessions. Each control participant contributed an average of 8.9
pToM events (SD= 0.72), 9.1 ToM events (SD= 0.9), and 9.3 EM
events (SD= 0.49) to the analyses. In session 1, H.C. contributed
7 pToM events and 9 ToM events to the analyses. In session 2, H.C.
contributed 15 pToM events, 12 ToM events, and 18 EM events to
the analyses.
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE pToM, ToM, AND EM EVENTS
We entered participants’ post-scan ratings into the analyses (as
opposed to the within-scanner ratings) as these were believed to
better correspond with the events participants described during
the post-scan interview. Table 2 presents participants’ phenome-
nological ratings of the pToM, ToM, and EM events. In terms of
vividness, H.C. rated the pToM events in session 1 as less vivid than
controls, t (17)=−2.68, p= 0.02; there was no difference for the
pToM events in session 2, t (17)=−0.73, p= 0.48. With respect to
the ToM events, vividness did not differ between H.C. and controls
for session 1, t (17)=−0.97, p= 0.34, or session 2, t (17)=−1.46,
p= 0.16. For the EM events, H.C.’s ratings were significantly less
vivid than that of controls, t (17)=−3.89, p= 0.0006. In terms of
the ratings assessing likeness to an actual memory, no significant
differences emerged between H.C. and controls for the pToM and
ToM events in session 1 or session 2 [pToM session 1 and session 2,
t (17)=−1.56, p= 0.14, and t (17)=−0.38, p= 0.70, respectively,
and ToM session 1 and session 2, t (17)=−0.58, p= 0.57, and
t (17)=−0.58, p= 0.57, respectively]. Finally, as expected, H.C.’s
ratings relating to the recollection of EM events were significantly
lower than that of controls, t (17)=−9.73, p< 0.00001.
ADAPTED AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL INTERVIEW
Given the use of visually rich photos as cues, we were most
interested in the elaborative details that participants generated.
We analyzed the data in two ways. First, we compared the aver-
age number of elaborative details H.C. and controls produced
in response to each pToM, ToM, and EM event. These absolute
numbers, however, are confounded by participants’ total verbal
output. To overcome this issue, we also calculated the proportion
Table 1 | Classification of descriptive versus elaborative details.
Type of detail Descriptive details Elaborative details
Action Any detail referring to an action that is depicted in the photo
(e.g., sitting, walking, standing, posing for the photo)
Any detail describing an action that is not obvious from the
photo
Character Any detail explaining who the people are in the photo (only for
the pToM and EM conditions)
Any detail describing who the people are or any detail that
refers to the relationship(s) between the people depicted in the
photo (only for the ToM condition)
Temporal N/A Any detail referring to a specific time period (e.g., year, season,
month, date, day of week)
Perceptual Perceptual details that are depicted in the photo (e.g., big
crowd of people, candles everywhere).
Describing or naming an object, monument or statue that is
depicted in the photo (e.g., Statue of Liberty)
Perceptual details that are not visible in the photo
Emotion/thought Any detail describing a facial expression (e.g., smiling,
frowning)
Any detail describing an emotion or mental state (e.g., happy,
sad, tired)
Spatial/Place Any detail describing a location (e.g., country, city, street,
location within a room) that can be inferred from information
presented in the photo (e.g., sign)
Any detail describing a location (e.g., country, city, street,
location within a room) that is not apparent from information
depicted in the photo
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Table 2 | Phenomenological qualities of the generated pToM,ToM, and
EM events.
pToM ToM EM
Vividness
H.C. session 1 2.1* 2.7 –
H.C. session 2 2.9 2.5 2.8*
Controls 3.2 (0.4) 3.1 (0.4) 3.6 (0.2)
Remember/know
H.C. session 1 – –
H.C. session 2 – – 2.6*
Controls – – 3.0 (0.04)
Similar to a Memory
H.C. session 1 2.7 3.3 –
H.C. session 2 3.3 3.3 –
Controls 3.5 (0.5) 3.6 (0.5) –
Standard deviations are given in parentheses; pToM, personal theory of mind;
ToM, theory of mind; EM, episodic memory; *p<0.05.
of elaborative-to-total internal details, which provides an index of
the weight given to descriptive versus elaborative details.
The mean number of elaborative details produced by par-
ticipants in response to each pToM, ToM, and EM event is
presented in Figure 12. In response to the pToM events, H.C.
produced significantly fewer elaborative details than controls dur-
ing session 1, t (17)=−3.1, p= 0.007, and there was a trend
toward impaired performance during session 2, t (17)=−1.8,
p= 0.08. In terms of the ToM events, no significant group dif-
ference emerged for session 1, t (17)=−1.6, p= 0.13, or session
2, t (17)=−0.98, p= 0.34. With respect to the EM events, as
expected, H.C. produced significantly fewer elaborative details
than controls, t (17)=−1.78, p= 0.0473.
The mean proportion of elaborative-to-total-internal details
produced by participants in response to each pToM, ToM, and EM
event is presented in Figure 2. Analyses revealed that H.C. pro-
duced a lower proportion of elaborative details (and therefore a
greater number of descriptive details) than controls in response to
the pToM events during both session 1, t (17)=−7.0, p< 0.00001
and session 2, t (17)=−4.99, p= 0.0001. In contrast, H.C. and
controls produced an equivalent proportion of elaborative details
in response to the ToM events during both session 1, t (17)= 0.77,
p= 0.45, and session 2, t (17)=−0.32, p= 0.75. Consistent with
our predictions, H.C. generated a lower proportion of elabora-
tive details relative to controls in response to the EM events,
t (17)=−2.57, p= 0.01.
DISCUSSION
H.C., a developmental amnesic person with bilateral hippocampal
damage, was impaired at imagining the experiences of personally
2Due to the small number of elaborative details produced for each event, we were
unable to make meaningful comparisons when the details were further divided into
the internal detail categories (i.e., event, place, time, perceptual, thought/emotion).
3We did not confirm the accuracy of participants’ reported memories. However,
anecdotal evidence provided by H.C.’s family suggests that she tends to fill in mem-
ory gaps. Therefore, H.C.’s EM scores are likely an overestimate of her episodic
memory capabilities.
known others, which resembles her compromised ability to recall
past experiences via episodic memory. These impairments stand
in contrast to her preserved ability to imagine the experiences of
unknown others. This pattern of results held whether we ana-
lyzed the average number of elaborative details (i.e., details that
go beyond what is visually depicted in the photo) or the pro-
portion of elaborative-to-total-internal details in order to control
for verbal output. These results bolster the finding that different
neural and cognitive mechanisms support thinking about per-
sonally known versus unknown others and that the former may
depend on processes mediated by the hippocampus and episodic
memory.
The idea that individuals rely on past personal experiences
to infer and simulate another’s mental state has been suggested
by philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists alike (Corcoran,
2000, 2001; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Buckner and Carroll, 2007;
Spreng and Mar, 2012). However, the current findings indicate that
reliance on past personal experiences may be pivotal only when
imagining the experiences of personally known others. Indeed,
knowing an individual for a long period of time and observ-
ing that person’s behavior in different situations provides a rich
source of information from which one can draw when imagin-
ing his/her mental states in various situations. Consistent with
this interpretation, Krienen et al. (2010) showed that participants
reported that they relied on a specific memory or anecdote sig-
nificantly more often when making judgments relating to friends
relative to strangers. In another study, Ciaramelli et al. (submitted)
found that participants’ level of empathy for a familiar charac-
ter was modulated by the retrieval of previous episodes involving
that character. Furthermore, using the same family photos para-
digm employed in the current study, we (Rabin and Rosenbaum,
2012) showed that the pattern of neural activity supporting pToM
shares more in common with episodic memory than with ToM.
Notably, the greatest degree of neural overlap between pToM and
episodic memory was observed within midline regions, including
the hippocampus and related MTL structures, regions traditionally
associated with the recollection of past events.
Reliance on past personal experiences to infer familiar oth-
ers’ mental states may occur with or without one’s intention or
awareness. There is accumulating evidence that episodic mem-
ory supported by the hippocampus can rapidly and automatically
influence performance on non-mnemonic tasks (Westmacott and
Moscovitch, 2003; Westmacott et al., 2004; Moscovitch, 2008; Ryan
et al., 2008; Greenberg et al., 2009; Sheldon and Moscovitch, 2010).
Gobbini and Haxby (2007) suggest that the mere perception of a
familiar individual is associated with the spontaneous retrieval
of personal knowledge about that individual (i.e., personal traits,
attitudes, biographical facts, and episodic memories), which in
turn may help to better understand and predict what the famil-
iar other is thinking and/or feeling. These automatic processes
may have been at play in the current study given that participants
were instructed not to refer to past episodes when generating the
pToM and ToM events. It is possible that participants engaged
in inhibitory processes to help overcome the prepotent tendency
to rely on past memories. Alternatively, other memory regulation
processes, such as thought substitution (Benoit and Anderson,
2012) may have been employed.
www.frontiersin.org January 2013 | Volume 3 | Article 588 | 5
Rabin et al. Episodic memory and imagining others’ experiences
FIGURE 1 |The mean number of elaborative details provided by H.C. and controls in response to each pToM,ToM, and EM event, *p<0.08; **p<0.05.
Error bars indicate standard deviations.
FIGURE 2 |The mean proportion of elaborative-to-total-number of internal details provided by H.C. and controls in response to each pToM,ToM, and
EM event, *p<0.01; **p<0.0001. Error bars indicate standard deviations.
Another possible explanation for H.C.’s corresponding impair-
ment in both episodic memory and pToM may relate to a deficit
in (re)constructing specific episodes. Evidence from neuroimag-
ing studies suggests that imagining specific versus general past
and future events elicits greater activity within the hippocampus
(Addis et al., 2011; Ford et al., 2011), likely due to the greater rela-
tional processing that is required for the former (Addis et al., 2011).
Several researchers have argued that individuals are more likely to
imagine close others with greater specificity relative to unknown
others. In contrast, unknown others are typically represented in
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more generic and abstract terms (Liviatan et al., 2008; Lieber-
man, 2012). This may be because we possess idiosyncratic theories
about close others’ personalities that enable us to richly imagine
how well-known others would respond in various scenarios (see
Lieberman, 2012). Therefore H.C.’s difficulty in generating spe-
cific details may account for her poor performance on the episodic
memory and pToM tasks.
It may be the case that for the pToM events H.C. attempted to
rely on a strategy that is optimal for people who are able to conjure
up contextual and specific details rather than relying on a strategy
that would be advantageous for her. Like controls, H.C. may have
been engaging in inhibitory processes of past events when gener-
ating the pToM and ToM events. However, because her episodic
recollection is impaired, she may have generalized this instruction
to personal semantic information, which would have likely helped
her to generate additional details for the pToM events. It is possible
that if she had been probed in a manner that enabled her to draw
more effectively on her intact personal or social semantic memory,
she may have performed better on the pToM task. Indeed, different
methods of cuing can differentially affect task performance. H.C.,
for instance, was impaired at imagining herself in future episodes
when provided with a specific cue word (e.g., “coffee”; Kwan et al.,
2010) but showed intact performance when a more general and
non-specific cue was provided (e.g., “Imagine something you will
be doing this weekend”; Hurley et al., 2011; see also Cooper et al.,
2011).
The corresponding deficit that emerged in episodic memory
and pToM is unlikely to be due to a deficit in narrative construc-
tion, given that H.C. had no difficulty constructing narratives in
response to the ToM events. This pattern of results is consistent
with those from a recent study showing that the ability to generate
a detailed narrative is preserved in adult-onset amnesia (Race et al.,
2011; but see Rosenbaum et al., 2009). Although the patients in the
study by Race and colleagues produced impoverished descriptions
of past and future events, they showed intact performance when
asked to tell a story in response to pictures depicting fictional
characters in various scenes. It is important to note that while
their participants were instructed to generate a story rather than
to report what was literally depicted in the picture, to our knowl-
edge, the authors did not examine whether participants adhered to
this instruction. In the current study, when examining the extent
to which participants relied on the visual content of the photos to
generate details, we found that approximately half of the details
H.C. produced for the pToM events consisted of descriptive details
(vs. 12.5% for controls). The current findings highlight the impor-
tance of examining descriptive versus elaborative details when rich
visual cues are used.
H.C.’s impairment in episodic memory and pToM contrasts
with her preserved ability to imagine the experiences of unknown
others during ToM. The latter finding is consistent with her intact
performance on a wide range of standard ToM tests that employ
strangers or fictional characters as targets (Rabin et al., 2012;
see also Rosenbaum et al., 2007). Imagining the experiences of
unfamiliar others may be achieved by relying on social seman-
tic memory, which remains relatively intact in H.C. This might
include reliance on generic representations about how the aver-
age person is expected to think and feel in a given situation
(Lieberman, 2012). Generic representations are likely based on
routines or schemas that are already bound together and therefore
require minimal relational processing. Recent fMRI findings from
our laboratory (Rabin and Rosenbaum, 2012), support this inter-
pretation. Using the same family photos paradigm, we recently
showed that relative to pToM, ToM involving unfamiliar others
elicited greater activity in lateral regions known to be associated
with accessing semantic knowledge (Martin and Chao, 2001).
Taken together, these data further corroborate the notion that
episodic memory may be needed for social cognition, but that
its role may be specific to imagining the experiences of personally
known, and not unknown, others.
The use of an open-ended ToM task allowed us to gain insight
into possible compensatory strategies that H.C. employed when
taking the perspective of another person. We found that H.C. gen-
erated a significantly greater proportion of descriptive details in
response to the pToM photos than did controls, suggesting that
she relied more heavily on the visual information depicted in the
photos to imagine the experiences of well-known others. This may
have included relying on the familiar other’s facial expression,body
language, and/or the relative spatial relations between people. This
strategy may serve her well in social settings when external cues
are readily available but may fail when cues are absent or when
situations are complex and require the integration of information
from the past and present.
H.C.’s performance on the pToM condition was not at floor
indicating that her ability to imagine the experiences of person-
ally familiar others is not obliterated. In fact, approximately 50%
of the details she generated in response to the pToM events were
elaborative details (i.e., details that go beyond what is visually
depicted in the photo). However, upon closer examination, even
the qualitative nature of the elaborative details she generated dif-
fered from that of controls. Specifically, H.C.’s responses tended to
reflect more basic emotional states that could be inferred from the
visual features of the photo, such as “they’re both really excited”
or “she looks really happy.” In contrast, control participants typi-
cally provided more complex mental state inferences such as “they
were probably afraid but they are trying to look cool” and “her
mother was pleased that her daughter was having so much fun”
(see Figure 3 for narrative samples).
H.C. generated a greater number of elaborative details in
response to the pToM and ToM events during session 2 relative
to session 1. It is important to note, however, that the overall
pattern remained consistent across the two testing sessions in
that, in both cases, H.C. produced fewer elaborative details for
the pToM versus ToM events. It is possible that the difference
across testing sessions reflects a practice effect resulting from expe-
rience with narrative generation. Although our two testing sessions
took place 3 years apart, H.C. participated in several other stud-
ies that required her to generate detailed narratives in the interim
(Kwan et al., 2010, 2011; Hurley et al., 2011). In fact, within these
other studies, H.C. showed improved performance on tests of
future imagining across testing sessions (Kwan et al., 2010; Hur-
ley et al., 2011). A related explanation for H.C.’s inflated scores
during session 2 is that she may have learned to use a more effec-
tive strategy that enabled her to generate a greater number of
details.
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FIGURE 3 | Representative samples of the pToM,ToM, and EM narratives provided by H.C. and a control participant.
In the current study, we attempted to control for vividness by
only including the pToM, ToM, and EM events with the highest
vividness ratings in our analyses. Nevertheless, analyses revealed
that H.C. rated the pToM events in session 1 and the EM events in
session 2 as less vivid than controls. In addition, we cannot rule out
that other factors, such as personal significance, differed between
H.C. and controls.
In conclusion, using an ecologically valid test of ToM, we
formally document that episodic memory supported by the hip-
pocampus may be pivotal for imagining the experiences of per-
sonally familiar, but not unfamiliar, others. The current findings
complement recent fMRI data and suggest that when imagining
other people’s experiences individuals are more likely to rely on
episodic memory when the target person is personally familiar
and on general social semantic memory when the target person
is unknown (Rabin and Rosenbaum, 2012). Continued research
with H.C. and other amnesic individuals, particularly those that
acquire damage later in life, is needed to better understand the
role that episodic memory plays in this and other aspects of social
cognition.
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